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COMMENTS
ANTI-TRUST LAW-NECESSITY OF PROOF OF SEPARATION OF PRODUCTS
TO ESTABLISH "TYING"
Thaes-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
Defendant company, publisher of the only morning newspaper and
one of two competing evening newspapers in New Orleans, refused to
sell general or classified advertising separately in either its morning
or evening paper, but sold such advertising only as a unit for the two
papers. In a civil action under the Sherman Act, the district court en-
joined the use of these "unit" contracts.2 Both parties appealed di-
rectly to the Supreme Court,3 which reversed the district court's de-
cision and held that the evidence was insufficient to establish either
an unreasonable restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize. 4
Section I of the Sherman Act has been construed as prohibiting only
unreasonable restraints of trade rather than all possible restraints.-
Section 1 is violated by conduct that is unreasonable per se, i.e., with-
out reference to the motivation causing the conduct, such as price-
1. 15 U.S.C._1§ 1-7 (1946). Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....
Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
Section 4 vests jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1-7
in the district courts of the United States and makes it the duty of the district
attorneys of the United States to enforce the Act.
2. The district court found that the morning Times-Picayune and the evening
States, though published by the same company, were two separate and distinct
newspapers reaching separate reader groups. The Times-Picayune was the "domi-
nant" newspaper in New Orleans and insertions in it were deemed essential by
advertisers desiring to cover the local market. The other evening paper, the Item,
was the only effective competition in the newspaper advertising field. The defend-
ants adopted unit selling in order to "... restrain general and classified advertisers
from making an untrammeled choice between [the States and the Item ...]
in purchasing advertising space, and also to substantially diminish the competitive
vigor of the Item .... " The results of this system, enforceable only because of the
dominant position of the Times-Picayune, was a substantial rise in classified and
general advertising in the States and an improvement of its comparative position
toward the Item. United States v. The Time-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F.
Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952).
3. A direct appeal to the Supreme Court is provided by 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1946).
4. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
5. The standard of reason which was applied to similar subjects at common law
is applied to these sections. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
178-181 (1911) ; The Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
60-62 (1911). See the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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fixing," boycotting,7 "tying,"8 and "blockbooking" by lessors of copy-
righted films., Section 1 is also violated by an otherwise reasonable
restraint used with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden result,10
and that intent may be inferred from unlawful effects.11 Section 2
prohibits attempts to monopolize. One who in fact achieves a mon-
opoly can be found guilty of an attempt to monopolize without proof
of a specific intent to do so,:1 but one who lacks monopoly power can
be found guilty only if such a specific intent is shown.1
"Tying" occurs when a seller who controls the supply of one product
refuses to sell that monopolized product unless the buyers also buy a
related but non-monopolized product.14 The monopolized product is re-
ferred to as the "tying" product, and the non-monopolized product is
the "tied" product. If "tying" forecloses competitive sellers of the
"tied" product from any substantial market, it is an umeasonable re-
straint per se under section 1.1-
The Court in the principal case held the fact that the defendant
owned the only morning newspaper in New Orleans did not by itself
establish a prima facie case of market control, and also held that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant did in
fact control the market. It is important to realize which market the
Court said the defendant did not control. The Court reasoned that
newspapers sell two different products: news and advertising content
to their readers, and the means of communicating with the public to
their advertisers. The market for news and advertising content was
separated into a morning market and an evening market, and the de-
fendant obviously controlled the morning market. The Court, how-
ever, found nothing in the record to suggest that the advertisers
6. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S.
436 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
7. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600(1913); cf. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
8. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
9. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
10. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
11. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) ; United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-108 (1948); United States v. Patten, 226
U.S. 525, 543 (1913).
12. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
13. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 532 (1948).
14. Lockhart and Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining
Whether Exclusive Arranfnements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HAnw.
L. Rav. 913, 942-943 (1952). Tying also occurs when a buyer who is the only
market for a product in one locality refuses to buy that product unless he is given
advantageous terms on the purchase of the product in localities where he is not
the only market. United States v. Grifth, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
15. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); International Salt Company
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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thought that communication with morning readers was separate and
distinct from communication with evening readers. The alleged
"tying" product (communication with morning readers) was not sepa-
rated from the "tied" product (communication with evening readers) ;
the two together formed a single product (communication with
readers). The market for communication, therefore, was not separted,
but was only one market. It was this undivided market that the de-
fendant did not control. The Court held that, because the principal
case did not factually fit the "tying" pattern, the restraint which
resulted from the use of the unit contracts was not unreasonable per
se. The Court further found that there was no proof in the record of
the specific intent necessary for an unreasonable restraint of trade
under section 1 or an attempt to monopolize under section 2.
The trial court attempted to straddle the issue of whether there
was a violation per se, and reached a decision that could not be upheld
on any ground because the court had not required proof of a specific
intent. The decision of the Supreme Court is sound because it requires
definite proof of individuation of products in "tying" cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WAIVER
OF UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Hibdon v. United States 204 F.2d &34 (6th Cir. 1953)
Appellant was tried in a federal court for commission of a felony.
After twenty-seven minutes of deliberation the jury reported that they
were unable to agree on a verdict. Both parties then agreed, at the
suggestion of the judge, to accept a majority verdict. A poll of the
jury disclosed a majority in favor of conviction, and the trial court
entered a verdict of guilty. The appellate court reversed the lower
court's judgment, remanded the case for a new trial, and held that a
defendant on trial in a federal court for commission of a felony can-
not waive his right to a unanimous verdict by the jury.1
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a unanimous ver-
dict.2 The court in the principal case points out that there is no pro-
vision in the present Rules for a waiver of this requirement by the
accused, despite the fact that such a provision was found in the First
Preliminary Draft of the Rules.2
Many of the rights guaranteed to an accused by the Constitution
1. Hibdon v. United States. 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
2. FuD. R. CR. P. 31 (a): "The verdict shall be unanimous."
3. FED. R. C& P. 29 (a) (First Prelim. Draft, 1943). The reason for the elimi-
nation of this provision was the adverse criticism of both the judiciary and the
bar. HIibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 836 (6th Cir. 1953).
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